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Abstract. Evolutionary psychologists have argued that revenge,
apology and forgiveness are moral sentiments that humans acquired
to establish and maintain long-term mutually beneficial relationships,
especially since misapprehensions, intentional or not, can always oc-
cur that could lead to worse outcomes. Their argument assumes an
evolutionary advantage to such emotional thinking, for which no ex-
plicit model was available. Using the iterated prisoners dilemma as
context, we provided analytical and numerical results that show that
these three behaviours emerge spontaneously, ensuring lasting co-
operation [16]. Concretely our work revealed that apology and for-
giveness are efficient even in a very noisy environment. Yet in order
for apology to work, it needs to be sufficiently costly as otherwise
exploiting the system by defecting and apologising is the most prof-
itable behaviour.
1 Introduction
Commitments by individuals in social interactions are established to
ensure favourable outcomes over long time periods [19]. Essentially,
interaction partners are coerced to comply to certain behavioural re-
strictions like cooperation instead of defection within the context of a
social dilemma. To ensure compliance a credible repercussion needs
to be in place. Emotions are one way to ensure compliance [5]. A nice
anthropological example associated with commitments is the sharing
on demand among foragers [26, 21].
In our prior work we formalised commitment behaviour in the
context of one-shot pairwise and n-player social dilemmas [9, 7, 8],
i.e. the prisoners dilemma and the public goods game: Prior to play-
ing the game, an individual can try to get the other to commit to
cooperate. This effort is costly () but if accepted leads to mutual
cooperation, unless the opponent cheats and defects anyway. Within
our formalisation we assume that when the latter happens the defec-
tor suffers a cost (δ) that benefits the one that honoured the com-
mitment (which we call compensation). This compensation could be
the result of executing a threat as well as the legal prosecution of
the defecting individual. Our analytical and numerical work showed
that commitment behaviour evolves and dominates in a population
when the cost  is smaller than the benefit of cooperation and the
compensation δ is bigger than the cost of cooperation and the cost
of setting up the commitment. Interestingly, the model also showed
that commitments, which are established prior to the social interac-
tion, are more effective than costly punishment [10], which acts only
posteriorly.
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Although commitments have shown their use in one-shot interac-
tions, they seem to be even more relevant for long-term relationships
[14], which required the expansion of our research to repeated games
like the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) [2]. Within the context of
the IPD a parameter ω specifies the probability that the interaction
is repeated. A second parameter α determines the likelihood that the
player takes an action opposed to her decision, i.e to play D when
intending to play C and vice versa. Such errors are the source of
misunderstandings and might trigger the end of the commitment. In
[16], we provided detailed analytical and numerical results within
that context using again Evolutionary Game Theory [22] as a tool.
These results are also reported in this abstract.
As commitment decisions occur over multiple rounds with the
same partner in the IPD, the individual strategies are required to take
into account additional issues next to the decision when to coop-
erate or defect: How to deal with mistakes made by the opponent
or by themselves before that the interaction is terminated? To de-
mand the compensation immediately as in the one-shot scenario or
wait? When the interaction is mutually beneficial enough to continue,
which mechanism should be put in place so that trust is reestablished
and the interaction can continue?
As asserted by evolutionary psychologists, humans have acquired
sophisticated strategies to ensure that mistakes are not repeated and
that profitable relationships may continue. McCullough [17, 18] has
eloquently argued that revenge for instance may have evolved exactly
to cope with those situations:
”The threat of revenge, through some punishment or withhold-
ing of a benefit, may discourage interpersonal harm.”
A world wherein social interactions are ruled by the fear for re-
venge is ruled by those that can make credible threats. Such world
appears to be unkind as honest mistakes would be severely punished,
destroying any reason to set up mutually beneficial relationships in
the first place. It is often not straightforward to identify whether or
not the other’s behaviour is accidental [4]. Looking again in society,
we can see that we have acquired the capacity to apologise when a
mistake is made and to forgive the person that makes the mistake.
Forgiveness provides a restorative mechanism that, notwithstanding
the initial harm, ensures that mutually beneficial relationships can
continue. An essential ingredient for forgiveness to work appears to
be (costly) apology [17], a point emphasised also in [23].
As we explained in [16], apology and forgiveness remove the ne-
cessity to get costly external parties (e.g. judicial institutions) in-
volved in order to ensure cooperation. For instance, it was shown
that customers prefer to continue their interaction with a company
that apologises [1]. Also in case of situations of medical error, apol-
ogy has been shown to lead to fewer lawsuits with lower settlements
[15]. Apology even enters the law as an effective mechanism of re-
solving conflicts [24]. It therefore makes sense to ask under which
conditions revenge, apology and forgiveness evolve to ensure sus-
tainable pro-social interactions.
2 Analysis
We here present some of the technical aspects of the model. For the
details see [16]. Our extension of the repeated games with commit-
ments, revenge, apology and forgiveness required the definition of
new strategies that require to address three questions:
1. Whether the player proposes (P ), accepts (A) or ignores (NC)
commitments, with the latter meaning that they play by refusing
commitment proposals.
2. Whether she cooperates (C) or defects (D) once the commitment
is established.
3. How to behave once the commitment is terminated. As there may
be remaining rounds of the IPD the player needs to decide how to
act. In [16], 4 options were provided, always cooperating (AllC),
always defecting (AllD), playing tit-for-tat (TFT ) and the in-
verse of tit-for-tat (ATFT ).
4. Whether to apologise (q = 1) when a defection occurs and con-
tinue to behave as in 2 (within a commitment).
We consider a well-mixed population formed by N individuals. In
each generation, individuals are randomly matched. They first decide
if they are proposing a commitment. If one or both individuals do it
and the other accepts it, the proposers pay an amount  (/2 if both
are proposing it) and the commitment is set up. In a second stage,
individuals play an Iterated Prisonner’s Dilemma with payoff matrix
( C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
)
(1)
A new round is repeated with probabilty ω. If the commitment was
set up and one of the individuals defects and do not apologise, the
defector pays an amounf δ to the other player and the commitment
is broken. The payoffs that individuals obtain are then the sum of
those obtained during the commitment, outside of the commitment,
and the amounts exchanged in setting up the commitment, apolo-
gising and/or compensating (see all the details in [16]). Payoffs are
a measure of the success of individuals and therefore the higher
the payoff the higher the probability of being imitated by others
[11, 22]. New generations are evolving following a discrete imitation
dynamic[20, 12], where a randomly chosen individual is copying the
strategy of another one according with the Fermi imitation proba-
bility function [3, 25]. Then we calculate the probability that each
strategy invades the others through fixation probabilities [13, 22].
These probabilities determine a transition matrix of a Markov chain
among strategies. The stationary distribution of strategies [12, 6] rep-
resents the relative time that the population spends adopting each of
the strategies.
3 Results and discussion
When apology is not possible, the most successful individuals are
those that propose commitments (and are willing to pay the cost )
and, following the agreement, cooperate until an error occurs. Once
this mistake occurs the commitment is broken and then these indi-
viduals take revenge by defecting in all the remaining rounds. This
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
γ
Fr
(S
) −
 Fr
(N
C,
−,A
llD
,−)
α=0.01
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
γ
Fr
(S
) −
 Fr
(N
C,
−,A
llD
,−) α=0.1
 
 
(P,C,AllD,q=1) (P,C,AllD,q=0) (P,D,AllD,q=1) (A,D,AllD,q=1)  
Figure 1. Stationary distribution of the main strategies with respect to the
stationary distribution of the pure defectors as a function of the apology cost
γ for α = 0.01 and α = 0.1. Vertical dashed lines mark the values of c and
δ. We assumed ω = 0.9, b/c = 2,  = 0.25, and δ = 4. Figure reproduced
from [16].
result is relatively important as it confirms analytically that it ap-
pears that individual players prefer to take revenge when apology
and forgiveness are not possible [17, 18]: Withholding benefits from
the wrongdoer appears to induce cooperation even better than to the
well-known TFT-like strategies in the IPD extended with commit-
ments.
Once the model allowed for individuals to apology and forgive,
revenge-taking no longer was the dominating strategy, even in situa-
tions when there was a 10% chance of making mistakes (α = 0.1).
In the simulations, apology was defined as a costly behaviour: when
a player apologises she pays a fine γ to the player that was harmed,
which was always accepted by the co-player. As we show in Figure 1,
our analytical results revealed that apology an forgiveness, and hence
long-term cooperation, evolves when the apology cost is sufficiently
high, i.e. slightly higher than the cooperation cost but much less than
the compensation that can be acquired by ending the commitment.
When the apology cost is too high, revenge dominates apologising.
When the apology cost is too low (lower than the cost of coopera-
tion), apology becomes exploited by cheaters who use it to get more
out of defecting, thus dishonest apologisers evolve. In a follow up ex-
periment we also examined the evolutionary dynamics of an agent-
based model wherein players have a personal apology value and a
forgiveness threshold. This model confirmed our results.
The research we discussed here showed for the first time in an ana-
lytical and numerical manner how emotional responses like revenge,
apology and forgeiveness are relevant for the evolution of coopera-
tion. Extension of this work to the repeated public goods game con-
firm the conclusions (work in progress) we were able to draw, urging
us to further explore the role of emotions in social interactions.
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